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Non-Technical Summary 
 
The way in which housing consumption and housing costs are treated when measuring 
income has some important implications for poverty analysis and conclusions about the anti-
poverty effects of policy reforms. This is because the number of people counted as poor (e.g. 
with income falling below a threshold) depends crucially on the income concept adopted.  
 
Official UK low income statistics use two alternative income measures: `Before Housing 
Costs' (BHC), where housing costs are not deducted from the income figure, and `After 
Housing Costs' (AHC), where they are. Both measures pose problems: BHC income does not 
capture the advantages of living in owner occupied housing and AHC income might not 
account for the benefits of living in higher quality accommodation. 
 
In this paper we use Family Resources Survey data and compare child and pensioner poverty 
estimates for the UK both under actual policies and under policy reform scenarios, based on 
the traditional BHC and AHC measures and also following an alternative `imputed rent' (IR) 
approach. The IR approach consists in adding to BHC income the difference between the 
estimated value of housing consumed and housing costs. In this way the IR measure captures 
the variation in the amounts paid out of cash income for housing and also recognises the 
higher relative living standards of households living in higher quality housing.  
 
Results suggest that once the net value of housing consumption is accounted for, child 
poverty risk is not significantly different from that estimated using the official BHC income 
measure, although the composition of children counted as poor is different. In contrast, 
pensioner poverty risk would fall to about one quarter its BHC value using the IR measure.  
 
Measures of the success of policy reforms in tackling poverty, such as the absolute reduction 
in the numbers counted as poor, are almost unaffected by the choice of income measure in the 
case of children. In contrast, the effect of a budgetary-equivalent reform for pensioners 
varies, depending on the chosen income measure. It is smallest for the IR measure because 
pensioner poverty is already low using this income definition.  
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Abstract 
The treatment of housing in the definition of income used to measure poverty makes a big 
difference to who is counted as poor. Both the Before Housing Costs (BHC) and After 
Housing Costs (AHC) measures in current use in the UK pose problems. We compare BHC 
and AHC income with an alternative measure, overcoming their respective flaws by 
including in income the difference between the estimated value of housing consumed and 
housing costs, or net imputed rent. We investigate whether findings about poverty among 
children and pensioners, and the effectiveness of poverty-reducing policies, are affected by 
accounting for housing in this way.  
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 1 
Introduction 
Income remains a core concept employed in poverty indicators and analysis despite 
being regarded as an incomplete measure of living standards, especially for those at 
the bottom end of its distribution (Atkinson et al., 2002). The number of people 
counted as poor (e.g. with income falling below a threshold) depends crucially on 
the income concept adopted. Issues related to income measurement, such as the 
reference time period and unit of income assessment, as well as the definition of the 
income concept itself, have attracted considerable debate, which has had an impact 
on the methodology adopted in official low income statistics.  
 One aspect of the measure of income used in poverty analysis that has drawn 
particular attention in the UK is the treatment of housing costs. Housing is deemed 
an integral component of family well-being, and has been a longstanding central 
concern of British governments and, in more recent years, has been pledged as a key 
component in tackling poverty and social exclusion agenda (Department for Work 
and Pensions (DWP), 2003). As well as the physical standard of housing itself being 
important in avoiding deprivation, the affordability of housing costs in relation to 
income is a major factor that impacts on the standard of living that can be achieved 
(Atkinson et al., 2002). Recognising that the cost of housing does not always match 
its consumption value, the official UK low income statistics Households Below 
Average Income (HBAI) present two alternative income series: `Before Housing 
Costs' and `After Housing Costs' (DWP, 2009). Before Housing Costs (BHC) income 
corresponds to the measure generally adopted for poverty analysis in the countries 
of the European Union and is now the primary income measure used in the 
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assessment of child poverty in the UK (DWP, 2003). It includes housing benefits in 
cash and does not deduct housing costs from the income figure, treating housing as 
any other consumption component. The problem is that in practice changing 
accommodation in order to meet a preferred housing cost level might be expensive 
and proportionally more so for people at the bottom end of the income distribution. 
Furthermore, variation in housing costs between households with comparable 
housing quality may arise simply as a result of living in a particular region or being 
at a particular stage in the life cycle, or as a result of fluctuating interest rates 
(Johnson and Webb, 1992; Buck et al., 2007).  
 For these reasons the second measure of income ‘After Housing Costs’ (AHC) 
provides an alternative perspective. AHC income is BHC income less gross housing 
costs. In factoring out housing costs the issues raised above are dealt with, but the 
fact that households occupy dwellings of different quality, affecting their relative 
standards of living, is not. First of all, some households are able to move house to 
find their desired quality-cost combination. For example, there is the case of young 
people who have chosen to buy relatively expensive accommodation, finding 
themselves in the lower part of the AHC distribution, at least temporarily. This 
choice can be seen as a form of saving to acquire an asset that might appreciate in the 
future, rather than a cost incurred for housing consumption (Gardiner et al., 1995). 
More generally, the AHC measure understates the relative standard of living of 
those enjoying better housing either through choice or good fortune.  
Indeed there are wider issues to be confronted in making welfare 
comparisons across households in different housing tenures. Social tenants benefit 
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from a “social wage” in the form of a subsidised rent (Sefton, 2002). Owner occupiers 
who own outright, or who have paid off some of their mortgage, benefit from living 
in their home to a greater extent than is indicated by the housing costs that they pay 
on a regular basis.  
To account for the difference between housing costs paid and quality of 
housing enjoyed, we take one step towards a more complete picture of individuals' 
command over resources, in the spirit of the comprehensive income concept. This third 
approach is to use the housing costs-to-quality relationship observed in the private 
rental market to impute a value for housing consumption, net of the housing costs 
actually incurred, across all tenure types. We then add this measure of net imputed 
rent to BHC income. We refer to this as the imputed rent (IR) approach. 
Imputed rent constitutes a large component of private in kind income in most 
European countries (Frick et al., 2008). Accounting for it acquires special relevance in 
the context of international comparisons of living standards and housing welfare 
provision, where different countries might adopt different mixtures of cash and in-
kind housing support (Gottshalk and Smeeding, 1997; Canberra Group, 2001). 
Contributions in the literature have offered empirical evidence of a strong 
inequality-reducing impact of imputed rent both in EU counties (Smeeding et al., 
1993; Eurostat, 1998; Frick and Grabka, 2003; Frick, Goebel and Grabka, 2007; Frick et 
al., 2007) and elsewhere in the world: Yates (1994) for Australia, Buckley and 
Gurenko (1997) for Russia and Gasparini and Escudero (2004) for Argentina. 
Measures of IR have also been included in the new European Union Statistics on 
Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) data, to enable the incorporation of IR in 
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the calculation of social indicators across the European Union (Eurostat, 2005). The 
aim of the paper is to demonstrate the difference the IR approach makes to income 
poverty measures for the UK. First, we draw out the implications for particular 
groups and their measured risk of poverty. Given recent UK policy attention, we 
focus on children and older people (referred to as “pensioners”, being over current 
state pension age). According to the official statistics, the risk of experiencing 
poverty is significantly higher for children and pensioners than it is for the working 
age population using the BHC measure, and also for children using the AHC 
measure (DWP, 2009). We explore whether this remains the case using the IR 
measure. In a second exercise we examine how conclusions about the effectiveness 
of some stylised poverty-reducing policies, targeted at children and pensioners in 
particular, would differ under the IR measure and the two traditional measures.  
Our methodological approach to estimating imputed rent draws on international 
work and is outlined below, followed by a description of the income measures and 
methods used in the analysis as a whole. We then present the poverty results under 
alternative income concepts, and findings concerning the sensitivity of the effects of 
simulated policy reforms to the choice of income concept. 
Imputing rents 
We use the 2003/04 Family Resources Survey (FRS) data which include 28,860 
private households in UK. The survey provides detailed information about 
individual income from various sources as well as housing costs and is used as the 
basis for the official HBAI low income statistics (DWP, 2005). Information on tenure 
type and housing characteristics is also provided and is used to derive IR. 
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The net imputed rent consists of what the occupant of a non-privately rented 
dwelling would need to pay in gross rent if renting in the private market, minus 
what they actually pay to live there. Amongst the methods previously used to derive 
a measure of imputed rent, some are based on the capital value of the owned 
accommodation and view imputed rents as a return on invested capital. For the 
purpose of measuring the value of housing consumption, however, a rent 
imputation based on the `price-to-house-characteristics' relationship observed in the 
private rental market seems more appropriate; it also allows us to estimate the 
“social wage” element of imputed rent for social tenants and a value of IR for those 
living rent-free, as well as the IR of owned accommodation. We follow this latter 
method and estimate a hedonic price regression on a sample of dwellings rented in 
the private market and use the estimated parameters to predict the imputed rent for 
owned, social rented and rent-free accommodation. The IR income measure is then 
obtained by adding the predicted imputed rent (net of any housing cost actually 
incurred - mortgage interest payments, rent payments, structural insurance and 
maintenance costs) to the standard BHC cash disposable income.  
 
TABLE 1: Housing tenure distribution in the United Kingdom 
 Proportion of people (weighted) 
 
Sample 
numbers 
(households) Population Children Pensioners 
Own outright 8,857  25.4  8.8  67.7  
With mortgage 10,853  47.1  59.3  7.7  
Private rent 2,178  7.9  7.4  2.0  
Social rent 6,567  18.5  23.6  21.0  
Rent free 404  1.1  1.0  1.6  
Total 28,859  100.0  100.0  100.0  
Source: our calculations based on the Family Resources Survey 2003/04 
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 Table 1 shows the distribution of self reported tenure type from the FRS. 
About 8% of the population occupy housing in the private rental market and we use 
households from this tenure type to estimate a hedonic regression for market rent, 
using reported information about gross rent paid and house characteristics.  
We adopt a log-linear specification, assuming a linear relationship between 
the logarithm of rent and a set of explanatory variables including the number of 
bedrooms, the Council Tax band, dummies for the presence of central heating and 
whether the accommodation is let furnished or not, the number of years the 
household has been occupying the property and the region in which the property is 
located.1 Regression results are given in Table 2. The estimation is based on a sample 
of 1,145 private tenants holding assured short hold letting agreements. Such cases 
represent approximately half of private tenants, but can be regarded as most 
representative of the private rental market prices that we wish to capture. Rents paid 
for these dwellings will be close to the prevailing market rent whereas those for 
other types of tenancies may relate to non-market agreements or contracts that were 
entered into some time in the past.2  
The reference accommodation is a one bedroom house, unfurnished, in 
Council Tax band A, with no central heating, located in the North East of England 
and in which the household has been living for less than 2 years. Coefficients in 
Table 2 can be interpreted as the percentage increase in gross rent that would result 
from a change in the value of each covariate for the reference accomodation, other 
things being equal. So for example, the market rent is 16.2% higher for two bedroom 
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houses and respectively 21.3% and 35.0% higher for three and four or more bedroom 
houses, compared with one bedroom houses. 
 
 
Table 2 Predicting Log Rent for Assured Shorthold tenants 
Explanatory variables coefficient s.e. 
Two bedrooms 0.162*** [0.031] 
Three bedrooms 0.213*** [0.035] 
Four or more bedrooms 0.350*** [0.055] 
Central heating 0.098*** [0.034] 
Council tax band B 0.129*** [0.033] 
Council tax band C 0.260*** [0.037] 
Council tax band D 0.355*** [0.043] 
Council tax band E 0.444*** [0.061] 
Council tax band F 0.589*** [0.075] 
Council tax band G-H 0.868*** [0.106] 
Council tax band: not valued separately -0.261*** [0.068] 
North West 0.141* [0.081] 
Yorkshire 0.131 [0.081] 
East Midland 0.141* [0.084] 
West Midland 0.039 [0.082] 
East 0.307*** [0.080] 
South East 0.383*** [0.078] 
South West 0.253*** [0.080] 
Wales -0.041 [0.089] 
Scotland -0.023 [0.079] 
Northern Ireland -0.145 [0.127] 
Inner London 0.687*** [0.085] 
Outer London 0.571*** [0.083] 
Lived at address for 2 to 10 years -0.119*** [0.025] 
Lived at address for more than 10 years -0.569*** [0.045] 
Property rented furnished 0.083*** [0.028] 
Constant 4.031*** [0.081] 
   
Observations 1,145  
R-squared 0.540  
Standard errors in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Source: our calculations using FRS 2003/04. 
 
 
 Central heating increases rent by one tenth and furniture by about 8%. The 
rent level progressively increases for accommodation classified in higher Council 
Tax bands, up to an 87% increase for band G and H housing, relative to band A 
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accommodation. Location in London increases market rent by 60% to 70%, and by 
25% to 40% in the South East, South West and East, relative to a location in the North 
East. Rent is 12% lower for accommodation occupied for more than two years and 
about 57% lower for accommodation occupied for more than ten years. This 
indicates the extent to which, in longer tenancies, rent does not keep pace with 
market increases. For this reason, in the ‘out of sample’ prediction based on the 
estimated function, it is assumed that all (hypothetical) rental agreements were 
initiated within the last 2 years. 3 
  Having obtained a value for the gross rent that home owners, social tenants 
and rent free tenants would need to pay for their current accommodation (gross IR), 
housing costs are deducted so that a net figure for IR can be obtained: the rent 
actually paid by reduced rent tenants, the amount of mortgage interest repayment 
for home owners with an outstanding mortgage, other costs related to maintenance 
and structural insurance and other charges that would in principle be paid by 
landlords. In some cases the deduction of these costs results in a negative value of IR 
implying that the cost of housing consumption outweighs any benefit that can be 
imputed to it. Negative IR, reducing income below its BHC level, applies to about 
5% of home owners repaying a mortgage and about 3% of social tenants. Table 3 
presents the resulting amount of weekly gross and net imputed rent, by tenure type. 
It shows how net imputed rent is significantly lower than the gross value for the 
tenure types with larger average housing costs: owners with a mortgage and social 
tenants. 
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Poverty analysis: methods and income measurement 
Our analysis of the BHC, AHC and “IR” income measures are based on the 
same FRS data as is used to impute IR. In order for all our empirical results to be 
consistent with each other we use incomes as simulated by POLIMOD, a tax-benefit 
model for the UK (Redmond et al., 1998), rather than using incomes as recorded in 
the FRS. We can, therefore, compare the incomes following simulated policy reforms 
with the incomes prevailing under 2003/04 policies. The POLIMOD simulated 
incomes have been defined to be as similar as possible to those used in the HBAI 
(DWP, 2009), both BHC and AHC. POLIMOD calculates liabilities for income tax 
and National Insurance contributions (NICs) and entitlements to Child Benefit, 
Working Tax Credit, Child Tax Credit, Income Support (including income-related 
Job Seekers Allowance), Pension Credit (including Savings Credit), Housing Benefit 
(HB) and Council Tax Benefit. Otherwise, elements of income (all original incomes 
and contributory and disability benefits) and housing costs (rent measured gross of 
HB) are drawn from the recorded values in the FRS dataset. The effects of non take-
up of means-tested benefits and tax credits are estimated by applying the take-up 
proportions estimated on a caseload basis by the DWP (2006) and HM Revenue and 
Customs (2006).4  
In common with HBAI our analysis uses the modified OECD equivalence 
scale to adjust BHC incomes for differences in household size and composition. The 
scale values are 1 for a single adult, 0.5 for any additional adult and 0.30 for a child 
under 14. In HBAI analysis of AHC income this scale is adjusted to allow for the fact 
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that housing economies of scale do not need to be taken into account. For simplicity 
here we use the same scale for all three income measures. As in HBAI analysis we 
define the poverty line as being 60% of median household equivalised income. This 
threshold naturally varies with the income concept that is used. 
The distribution of simulated incomes is somewhat different from the 
distribution of recorded incomes. The appendix compares poverty thresholds and 
rates for 2003/04 from HBAI with those estimated from POLIMOD for BHC and 
AHC incomes. Discrepancies are mainly due to the fact that simulated income tax 
assumes that incomes, as recorded for a particular month in the FRS, are received in 
the same way all year and that the adjustments made for the non take-up of benefits 
cannot exactly match actual take-up behaviour. However, our focus is on the 
differences made by the inclusion of IR in income, rather than levels of poverty risk 
as such.  
In the analysis of the effect of the choice of income concept on measured 
poverty we focus on poverty risk among children and pensioners. Children are 
defined as being aged under 16 or under 19 if in full time secondary education or 
themselves married. Pensioners are defined as men aged 65 or more and women 
aged 60 or more. As shown in Table 1 there are significant, but not surprising, 
differences in the distribution of tenure types for these two groups. While about two 
thirds of pensioners own outright, less than one in ten children live in owned-
outright housing. About the 60% of children live in housing with an outstanding 
mortgage but less than 8% of pensioners are in this position. A very low proportion 
of pensioners are private tenants, and about 7% of children live in private rental 
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accommodation. However, the shares of children and pensioners living in social 
housing are comparable at slightly over 20%.5 This suggests that on average 
households with pensioners are likely to incur lower housing costs compared with 
households with children and, other things being equal, are likely to benefit to a 
greater extent from housing consumption that is not accounted for in the traditional 
measures. Table 3 shows net IR separately for children and pensioners, in contrast 
with IR for the population as a whole. 
 
Table 3 Estimated weekly imputed rent (£) by tenure type and demographic group 
 Gross IR  Net IR 
 Population  Population Children Pensioners 
 Mean sd  Mean sd Mean sd Mean sd 
Own outright 140.2 59.7  126.1 57.7 137.3 68.0 122.3 54.6 
Own with mortgage 137.7 55.0  67.6 53.0 66.2 52.1 88.6 62.7 
Social rent 107.1 42.9  46.9 39.2 50.6 41.9 42.8 31.2 
Rent free 129.8 65.3  129.3 65.2 132.2 68.1 123.7 57.7 
          
All types 132.1 55.8  74.1 61.7 64.6 57.8 100.6 61.8 
Source: our calculations using FRS 2003/04 
 
 In both cases, outright owners and people living rent free are allocated the 
highest amounts of net imputed rent, followed in order by owners with an 
outstanding mortgage and social tenants. Generally, the level of IR within tenure 
type is similar across the two demographic groups. However, average imputed rent 
for outright owner and social tenant pensioners is not as large as for the households 
in which children live, possibly reflecting the lower quality or smaller size of 
housing in which older people live, relative to children in these tenure types. In the 
case of housing owned with a mortgage the reverse is shown, reflecting pensioners' 
later stage in the repayment of their mortgage. 
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Results: poverty using alternative income concepts  
We consider the effect of the choice of income concept on poverty rates.6 Table 4 
reports each index calculated according to the BHC, AHC and IR income measures 
for children and pensioners, and their decomposition by tenure type, together with 
the value of the poverty threshold for each measure of income.  
 
Table 4 Child and pensioner poverty rates by tenure type% 
  Child poverty  Pensioner poverty 
  BHC  AHC  IR  BHC  AHC  IR 
             
Own outright  22.0  18.4  14.8  27.5  22.2  3.7 
Mortgage  11.9  14.1  11.5  16.1  17.2  7.3 
Private tenants  17.6  54.8  36.8  10.9  38.9  17.7 
Social tenants  40.8  63.3  45.0  10.3  44.3  9.1 
Rent free  28.3  25.1  15.1  36.4  26.0  3.5 
All  20.2  29.2  21.6  22.8  26.9  5.4 
Source: our calculations using POLIMOD with FRS 2003/04 
 
Focussing first on children it is clear that the two official measures provide 
different indications of the prevalence of child poverty. According to the BHC 
measure, 20% of children have household incomes below the poverty line, with poor 
children over-represented amongst social tenants. On an AHC basis, the proportion 
of children living in poverty is higher by almost half of its BHC value at 29% and 
children in private rented accommodation as well as social housing are 
disproportionately represented. Once net imputed rent is added to BHC income the 
child poverty rate reaches a level between that of the BHC and AHC measures (22%) 
and the relative risk of poverty by tenure shifts relative to each of the official 
measures. Children in owned-outright housing have a lower poverty risk using the 
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IR measure than under either the BHC or AHC measures (15% compared with 22% 
or 18%) while children in housing owned on a mortgage have a similar risk using the 
IR measure as they do on a BHC basis. However children in social and private 
rented accommodation have an IR poverty risk that is higher than that using BHC 
but lower than that using AHC income. It may at first sight be surprising that the 
child poverty risk among private tenants is any different under the IR measure than 
using BHC income, since no imputed rent has been added to the income of these 
households. However, the poverty threshold, measured as 60% of median income is 
19% higher under the IR measure than using BHC income. While the incomes of 
private tenant households are not affected by the shift from BHC to IR, their incomes 
relative to the median have fallen.  
The relationship between the poverty thresholds and the distributions of the 
three income measures can be seen more clearly in Figure 1, which shows the 
distributions separately for children and pensioners. For children, both the threshold 
and the distribution move to the right with the addition of imputed rent, leaving the 
IR poverty rate little different from that under the BHC measure. In contrast, for 
pensioners the concentration of pensioners below the poverty line evident for BHC 
as well as AHC income, disappears for the IR measure. As a consequence, pensioner 
poverty risk is strikingly reduced to 25% of its BHC value. Poverty risk is especially 
reduced for home owners, and also rent free tenants. As for children, private tenant 
pensioners, a small group, appear at a higher risk of poverty under the IR measure.  
The main reason for such different outcomes between pensioners and 
children lies in their tenure status differences. 
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Figure 1 Income distribution and poverty thresholds using alternative income concepts 
 
0 100 200 300 400 500
.
Children
0 100 200 300 400 500
Equivalised household income
BHC AHC IR
Pensioners
Source: our calculations using POLIMOD with FRS 2003/04
 
 
 
Pensioners, as discussed above, mostly own outright and therefore are 
attributed with a large amount of net IR. Children on the other hand mostly live in 
housing with an outstanding mortgage, or social housing.  
Are reform evaluations sensitive to the income measure used? 
 In this section we assess the extent to which conclusions about a particular policy 
reform are sensitive to the income measure chosen to evaluate its effect on poverty. 
We simulate two simple reforms to the UK tax and benefit system aimed at tackling 
child and pensioner poverty respectively. For illustrative purposes the two reforms 
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are designed to have the same budgetary cost. Thus we can, in a stylised manner, 
consider which reform provides better value in terms of its poverty-reducing 
implications and then consider whether the choice of the income measure used to 
define poverty makes any difference to this assessment.  
The reform intended to reduce child poverty is an increase to the Child Tax 
Credit (CTC) per-child amount. We simulate an increase of £12 a week in the per-
child maximum amount using the POLIMOD microsimulation model. This reform, 
which represents a 43% increase in the per-child payment, has been chosen for our 
illustration because it corresponds approximately to the increase that has been 
suggested as being the minimum amount necessary to achieve the UK target of 
halving child poverty by 2010 (Hirsch 2006).7 We estimate the first round net 
budgetary cost to the government as being £3.8 billion a year.8 The reform is not 
simulated as revenue-neutral, as the distributional impact of the additional tax 
burden would act as a confounding factor. 
The reform intended to reduce pensioner poverty is instead an increase in the 
means-tested Pension Credit (PC), whose ‘guarantee element’ tops income up to a 
maximum amount of £102.10 per week for a single person and £155.80 for a couple 
(in 2003/04), depending on personal circumstances. The simulated reform adds an 
extra 18.7% to the Guarantee maximum (equivalent to £19.05 per week for single 
pensioners and £28.45 for pensioner couples). This increase is designed such that the 
first round cost to the government is the same as the reform for children, described 
above.9 
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Table 5 Gainers (%) and the average increase in household income (£/ week) for children and 
pensioners following an increase in Child Tax Credit (for children) and Pension Credit (for 
pensioners) 
 
 Children (CTC reform) Pensioners (PC reform) 
% Gainers   
All tenure types 50.4 44.0 
 Own outright 50.6 34.3 
 Mortgage 34.1 .41.3 
 Private tenants 70.6 66.1 
 Social tenants 84.7 72.6 
 Rent free 62.2 65.3 
Average gain among gainers 
(std. dev) 
12.11 (4.40) 15.33 (8.39) 
Source: our calculations using POLIMOD with FRS 2003/04 
 
 
Table 5 reports the tenure type of those who gain from the simulated CTC 
and PC reforms and the average income increase across households that benefit. 
About 44% of all pensioners and 50% of all children would gain from these policies. 
The average increase in household income per pensioner gaining would be £15.33 
per week, an amount not much larger than the average increase in household 
income per child gaining: £12.11.10 In both groups people in private and social rented 
accommodation are more likely to gain. These are the tenure types more likely to be 
occupied by people entitled to means-tested benefits.  
How effective the reforms are in reducing child and pensioner poverty 
according to the three income measures is shown in Table 6. According to the BHC 
measure, the CTC reform would succeed in lifting almost one in three children out 
of poverty. However, using the AHC income concept, the exit rate would be closer to 
one in five children only. This difference is solely because the number of children 
counted as poor is higher on the AHC basis. The number of children brought out of 
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poverty is almost the same in the two cases (830 thousand or 6.4% of all children) 
and is indeed very similar using the IR measure. 
 
Table 6 Child and pensioner poverty reduction due to policy reforms, under alternative income 
concepts and by tenure type 
 Children Pensioners 
 BHC AHC IR BHC AHC IR 
Poverty rate BEFORE 20.2 29.2 21.6 22.8 26.9 5.4 
Poverty rate AFTER 13.8 22.8 15.1 18.1 12.1 4.2 
Reduction (ppts) 6.4 6.4 6.5 4.7 14.8 1.3 
Exit rate % 32 22 30 22 56 26 
Number leaving 
poverty 
832,000 834,000 845,000 517,000 1,577,000 146,000 
Tenure composition of those brought out of poverty (%)   
Outright owners 3.0 6.6 4.8 75.7 53.0 42.2 
Own with mortgage 20.2 20.8 19.4 7.6 3.9 9.7 
Private tenants 6.8 11.1 10.0 1.8 2.8 3.7 
Social tenants 69.7 60.8 65.1 12.9 38.7 42.1 
Rent free 0.3 0.6 0.8 2.3 1.6 2.1 
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: our calculations using POLIMOD with FRS 2003/04 
 
The tenure composition of those brought out of poverty is somewhat different 
when comparing the BHC with IR measures, however. There are fewer social tenants 
and more private tenants and outright owners, while the largest group brought out 
of poverty is clearly social tenants using all measures.  
 In the case of pensioners, the measurement of the impact of the PC reform on 
pensioner poverty as a whole is more sensitive to the choice of the income measure, 
than in the case of children: while the exit rates for pensioners are similar under IR 
and BHC, the numbers brought out of poverty are much lower using the IR measure. 
This is because pre-reform pensioner poverty using IR is very low and the 
proportional effect, while similar to that under BHC, represents a much small 
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number of pensioners (146 thousand, a third of the number brought out of poverty 
under the BHC measure). The contrast with the AHC measure is even larger, 
because the pre-reform AHC pensioner poverty is much higher: the reform appears 
very effective as moving more than half of the number counted as poor on this basis 
across the poverty line. The tenure composition of pensioners brought out of poverty 
also shifts significantly: away from outright owners and towards social tenants.  
 If one were judging, on the basis of the evidence presented here, whether 
spending on child or pensioner benefits would be more effective at reducing poverty 
among the respective group, the conclusion would depend on the income concept 
that was used. On an AHC basis the reform to PC would be extremely effective at 
moving pensioners across the poverty line. About twice as many pensioners would 
be brought out of poverty as children under the budget-equivalent CTC reform. On 
a BHC basis the numbers are relatively close, with child poverty reduced to a greater 
extent than pensioner poverty. Under the IR measure, pensioner poverty is much 
lower before the reform and the reform itself has a relatively small absolute effect on 
the poverty numbers. Using this income concept, spending the money on children 
seems like the more effective strategy.  
Conclusions 
The way in which housing consumption and housing costs are treated when 
measuring income has some important implications for poverty analysis and 
conclusions about the anti-poverty effects of policy reforms. In this paper we have 
compared poverty estimates for the UK both under actual policies and under policy 
reform scenarios, based on the traditional BHC and AHC measures and also 
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following an alternative `imputed rent' approach. The adoption of the IR measure 
can potentially provide a more comprehensive and consistent picture of living 
standards and therefore improve judgements about the success of policy reforms in 
terms of their implications for poverty or income distribution generally.  
We find that once the net value of housing consumption is accounted for, 
child poverty risk is not significantly different from that estimated using the official 
BHC income measure. However, the composition of children counted as poor is 
different, with more children living in privately rented accommodation and fewer 
from owned outright housing being included. In contrast, pensioner poverty risk 
would fall to 5% (one quarter its BHC value) using the IR measure.  
Measures of the success of policy reforms in tackling poverty, such as the 
absolute reduction in the numbers counted as poor, are almost unaffected by the 
choice of income measure in the case of children and an increase in CTC. In contrast, 
the effect varies for pensioners and a budgetary-equivalent increase in PC, 
depending on the chosen income measure. It is smallest for the IR measure because 
pensioner poverty is already low using this income definition.  
One can argue about whether IR should be included as income for poverty 
measurement. On the one hand, as we have explained, including IR allows better 
comparisons between incomes across tenure types: it captures the fact that some 
households, such as those owning outright, pay little for housing out of cash income, 
whereas this is not the case for BHC income. At the same time the IR measure 
overcomes the drawbacks of the AHC measure, potentially concealing the effect on 
relative living standards of households living in higher quality housing. 
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On the other hand, adopting the inclusion of IR as standard in poverty 
measurement would pose challenges in practice. It would require a better 
assessment of the costs of ownership than has been possible in this study. For 
example, some deductions from income would need to be made for the elderly 
person living in an owned dwelling that is in need of repair and which they are 
unable to maintain. Put another way, aspects of housing quality that are not 
captured by the variables available to us would need to be included. Nevertheless it 
seems clear that the inclusion of IR would reduce the assessed risk of poverty for 
pensioners as a whole relative to children as a whole. This would have the effect of 
re-emphasising the already high profile policy problem of child poverty in the UK 
which remains insensitive to the treatment of housing income that we have 
considered here. 
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1 Descriptive statistics for the relevant covariates, by tenure type, are available from the authors on 
request.  
2 As a robustness check, the estimation was repeated on the whole sample of private tenants and also 
on “trimmed” samples where a percentage of top and bottom rent value cases were excluded. Most 
coefficients were significant and comparable in size across the four estimation samples. Despite the 
reduced sample size, the estimation carried out on the assured short hold agreements sample 
exhibited the highest R squared. 
3 Also, owned accommodation is treated as being rented unfurnished. 
4 Where ranges of take-up proportions are published, the mid point is used.  
5 Note that the `social rent' category mainly includes those living in accommodation rented from 
Local Authorities or Housing Associations but also includes a few cases (3% of the group) renting 
from an employer or a family member. 
6 Similar results are found for the remainder of the poverty indices from the Foster Greer Thorbecke 
(1984) class. FGT0 corresponds to the headcount ratio or poverty rate, used here. The FGT1 index 
measures the average `poverty gap' (the distance from the poverty line) as a proportion of the poverty 
line. The FGT2 index is similar to the FGT1 but gives more weight to the largest poverty gaps. 
7 However, due to other differences in assumptions the estimates here and those used by Hirsch 
(2006) are not strictly comparable. 
8 This estimate allows for some non take-up of entitlements to CTC. For example, caseload take-up for 
working families of CTC and WTC was 91% for lone parents and 73% for couples in 2003 (HMRC, 
2006). 
9 Allowing for non take-up of PC between 63% and 73% (DWP, 2006). 
10 The difference is simply a function of the extra spending being somewhat more concentrated 
among fewer pensioners. There were 23% more children than pensioners living in UK households in 
2003.  
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Appendix 
Comparing poverty thresholds (un-equivalised £ / week) and poverty rates (%) from HBAI 
and POLIMOD 2003/04 
 Before Housing Costs After Housing Costs 
 HBAI POLIMOD HBAI POLIMOD 
Poverty threshold 
(for a single person) 
123 131 98 116 
Poverty Rate: All 18 17 21 23 
Children 22 20 29 29 
Pensioners 23 23 21 27 
Source: DWP (2009; tables 3.7ts and 6.6ts), DWP (2005; table 2.3) and our calculations using POLIMOD based on 
the Family Resources Survey 2003/04. 
Note: The equivalence scale used for the HBAI results is the modified OECD scale for the BHC measure and the 
“companion” scale for the AHC measure. POLIMOD estimates use the modified OECD scale for BHC and AHC 
equivalisation. 
 
 
 
